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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
MARK RAYMOND DASTRUP, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was the court of appeals correct in holding that State v. 
Hoff, 814 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1991), mandated that, when it accepts a 
guilty plea as knowing and voluntary, "the trial court must base 
its findings solely on the colloquy [between the trial court and 
the defendant], without considering any statements made in the 
affidavit?" State v. Dastrup. 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48, 49 (Utah 
App. September 27, 1991). 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is State 
v. Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (Utah App. September 27, 1991), 
(a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The decision in this case was issued on September 27, 1991. 
The state timely filed requests for a stay of the remittitur and 
for an extension of time in which to file this petition, which 
requests were granted. This Court has jurisdiction to consider 
this petition under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-ll(e) (Supp. 1988) (amended 
1989, repealed eff. July 1, 1990J.1 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or 
no contest and shall not accept such a plea until the 
court has made the findings: 
(1) That if the defendant is not 
represented by counsel he has knowingly 
waived his right to counsel and does not 
desire counsel; 
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) That the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, to a 
jury trial and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea he 
waives all of those rights; 
(4) That the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to which 
he is entering the plea; that upon trial the 
prosecution would have the burden of proving 
each of those elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and that the plea is an admission of 
all those elements; 
(5) That the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is 
entered, including the possibility of the 
imposition of consecutive sentences; and 
(6) Whether the tendered plea is a result 
of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement 
and if so, what agreement has been reached. 
If it appears that the prosecuting 
attorney or any other party has agreed to 
request or recommend the acceptance of a plea 
to a lesser included offense, or the 
1
 Effective April 24, 1989, former rule 11(e) was 
redesignated as rule 11(5). 
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dismissal of other charges, the same shall be 
approved by the court. If recommendations as 
to sentence are allowed by the court, the 
court shall advise the defendant personally 
that any recommendation as to sentence is not 
binding on the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 7, 1989, defendant was charged with 106 counts of 
forgery and theft (R. 1-28). The same day an amended information 
was filed charging defendant with ten counts of forgery, all 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 
(1990), seven counts of theft, all second degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990), and one count of 
theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-404 (1990) (R. 39-44). On March 8, 1989, defendant pleaded 
guilty to all 18 counts (transcript of arraignment proceeding 
[hereinafter "T." ] 11-15). Defendant was sentenced to serve a 
term of not less than 1 year nor more than 15 years at the Utah 
State Prison on each of the second degree felony counts, and a 
term not to exceed 5 years in the Utah State Prison on the third 
degree felony theft count, all sentences to be served 
concurrently (transcript of sentencing proceeding [hereinafter 
"T.A."] 18-19). 
On August 1, 1989, defendant filed a request for withdrawal 
of guilty plea (R. 61-63). A hearing on defendant's motion was 
held February 7, 1990, and the trial court denied the motion on 
that date (transcript of hearing on motion to withdraw guilty 
plea [hereinafter "T.B."] 8). Defendant filed his notice of 
appeal on March 8, 1990 (R. 104-105). On appeal, the court of 
3 
appeals reversed, holding that the plea was defective because the 
trial court failed to follow the requirements for the entry of a 
guilty plea, as set forth in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987) and Hoff. Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv Rep. at 49. 
The facts pertinent to the resolution of this case are 
accurately set forth in the court of appeals' decision, 170 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 48, with the following additions. At defendant's 
arraignment proceeding the trial court asked defendant his age, 
educational level and ability to read and write the English 
language (T. 3); whether defendant was under the influence of 
alcohol or narcotics or was suffering from any mental illness (T. 
4); and whether defendant had any questions as to his 
constitutional rights enumerated by the court, including the 
right to representation by counsel, the right to a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury, the right of confrontation and cross 
examination, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the 
right to obtain witnesses in his defense, the right to a 
unanimous verdict by tne jury in order to secure a conviction, 
and the right to appeal (T. 5-6). In addition, the trial judge 
questioned defendant as to whether the plea was made absent 
threats or promises (T. 7); whether defendant actually committed 
the forgeries and thefts set out in the amended information (T. 
9-10); and whether defendant understood that the court, and not 
the attorneys, determined the penalty that would be assessed (T. 
10). The trial court informed defendant of the minimum and 
maximum penalties that could be imposed (T. 4-5). The court was 
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also made aware that the plea had been negotiated and 
specifically stated that it would not accept the plea unless 
defendant admitted that he had actually committed the crimes as 
set forth in the amended information (T. 9). Defendant, when 
asked by the court if he wanted the court to accept the plea 
bargain, responded affirmatively (Id,). 
After defendant had responded to the questions to the 
satisfaction of the trial court, defendant signed an affidavit in 
support of his plea and entered guilty pleas to all 18 counts in 
the amended information (T. 9, 11-15) (a copy of defendant's 
affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum B). The trial court 
specifically found that defendant was advised of his 
constitutional rights and that defendant had made a voluntary and 
intelligent plea (T. 11). 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS TOO BROADLY INTERPRETED 
GIBBONS AND HOFF TO MANDATE THAT A REVIEWING 
COURT ONLY CONSIDER THE COLLOQUY BETWEEN A 
DEFENDANT AND THE TRIAL COURT PRIOR TO THE 
ENTRY OF A GUILTY PLEA IN DETERMINING THE 
VALIDITY OF SUCH A PLEA. 
In reversing the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the court of appeals found 
that the trial court, during its oral colloquy with defendant, 
had apprised him of his constitutional rights enumerated in rule 
11(5), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 48. Those rights included the right to representation by 
counsel, the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the 
right of confrontation and cross examination, the right against 
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to obtain witnesses in 
-5-
his defense, the right to a unanimous verdict by the jury in 
order to secure a conviction and the right to appeal (T. 5-6). 
However, the trial court had not informed defendant on the record 
that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving those rights. 
Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. 
The court of appeals, relying on Hoff's interpretation 
of State v. Gibbons, found the plea defective even though the 
affidavit executed in open court at the time defendant entered 
his plea "clearly and unequivocally statefd] that the defendant 
ha[d] knowingly waived his constitutional rights." Dastrup, 170 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 49. In so holding, the court noted that 
"[a]lthough the better approach may be to consider the colloquy 
and the affidavit in unison since both constitute evidence 
properly before the court, the supreme court has precluded us 
from taking such an approach." Ijd.2 In support of its holding, 
the court relied on the following language from Hoff: 
The rule announced in Gibbons was intended to ensure 
that the record demonstrates that the judge who takes 
the plea personally establishes that a defendant's 
guilty plea is truly knowing and voluntary. To that 
end, Gibbons requires that at the time a guilty plea is 
entered the judge should establish on the record that 
the defendant knowingly waived his or her 
2
 Prior to Dastrup, the court of appeals had recently held 
in both State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 (Utah App.), petition 
for cert, filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 1991), and State v. 
Truiillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App.), petition 
for cert, filed, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 (Utah 1991), that a trial 
court could consider both the colloquy and the affidavit in 
determining whether a defendant's plea was being entered in 
strict compliance with rule 11. The rationale for those holdings 
is well articulated by Judge Russon's concurrence in Dastrup, 170 
Utah Adv. Rep at 49-52 (Russon, J., concurring). 
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constitutional rights and understood the 
elements of the crime. 
Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122 (emphasis added). See Dastrup, 170 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 48-49. 
This Court's focus in both Gibbons and Hoff remained 
consistent with both its own and the United States Supreme 
Court's precedent, that the trial court ensure that a defendant 
enter a "knowing and voluntary" plea. See, e.g., Bovkin v. 
Alabama, 395 P.2d 238, 242 (1968); State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
1266, 1273 (Utah 1988). This Court's insistence that a trial 
court strictly comply with rule 11 requirements in accepting a 
guilty plea is wholly consistent with that focus. Neither 
Gibbons nor Hoff rejected the use of an affidavit in the taking 
of a guilty plea. Those cases only required that the affidavit 
not be the "end point" in the taking of a plea and that it be 
reviewed on the record by the trial court before the acceptance 
of a plea. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-14; Hoff, 814 P.2d at 1122. 
By interpreting Gibbons and Hoff to require a "rote recitation of 
all the Rule 11 elements in the colloquy, without regard to 
whether they are specified in the affidavit," the court of 
appeals erroneously felt compelled to reject the much better and 
more thorough process of "us[ing an affidavit] in concert with a 
thorough colloquy with includes questions as to [a] defendant's 
understanding of his affidavit." Dastrup, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
52 (Russon, J., concurring); State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 477 
(Utah App.), petition for cert, filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 
(Utah 1991) and State v. Truiillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 
(Utah App.), petition for cert, filed, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 67 
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(1991). 
The instant case presents an example of a plea accepted 
by the trial court after a vigorous on the record review of rule 
11 requirements, but with one omission (i.e., not informing 
defendant that he was waiving certain rights that had been 
specifically identified). It included a thorough affidavit, each 
paragraph of which defendant initialed, including a paragraph 
that clearly advised defendant that he was waiving the specified 
rights. The affidavit was signed in open court by defendant and 
certified by the defense attorney and the prosecutor. The on the 
record colloquy and the affidavit, viewed together, 
overwhelmingly support a finding that the plea was entered 
voluntarily and knowingly and in strict compliance with rule 
ll.3 Gibbons and Hoff do not require a different conclusion. 
Thus, the court of appeals, in holding that the affidavits cannot 
be considered, has decided a question of law in a way that is in 
conflict with decisions of this Court; and, even if it can be 
argued that the court of appeals' decision does not directly 
conflict with Gibbons and Hoff, it constitutes a decisions on an 
important question of law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court. 
Accordingly, certiorari should be granted under either 
subsection (b) or subsection (d) of rule 46, Utah Rules of 
3
 This case does not directly pose the issue of what test 
applies on appellate review of the validity of a guilty plea, the 
traditional "record as a whole" test or a "strict compliance" 
test, which would result in automatic reversal if a trial court 
has not strictly complied with rule 11 requirements. That issue 
has been addressed in the State's petition for rehearing in State 
v. Maquire, No. 900555, filed with this Court on July 23, 1991. 
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Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £-1 day of November, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Vjfesistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Sheldon R. Carter, Harris, Carter & Harrison, attorney for 
appellant, 3325 N. University Ave, Suite 200, Jamestown Square, 
Clocktower Building, Provo, Utah, 84604, this <2 I day of 
November, 1991. 
J 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
48 State v. Dastrup 170 Utah Adv. Rep 48 CODE •Co Prcno. Utah 
fore, we reverse and remand on the felony 
theft conviction issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 
trial court's denial of the motion for a conti-
nuance, and reverse and remand on the felony 
theft conviction for proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1) (1989) prov-
ides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punis-
hable: 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if 
the: (i) value of the property or services 
is more than $250 but not more than 
$1000; 
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(c) (1989) pro-
vides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punis-
hable: 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the 
value of the property stolen was more 
than $100 but does not exceed $250; 
Cite as 
170 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Mark Raymond DASTRUP, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 900144-CA 
FILED: September 27, 1991 
Sixth District, Sevier County 
Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
ATTORNEYS: 
Shelden R. Carter, Provo, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S.H. Atherton, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Russon. 
OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Defendant entered a guilty plea to ten 
counts of forgery, ail second-degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501 
(1990), and eight counts of theft, one third-
degree felony and seven second-degree felo-
nies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-
404 (1990). Defendant subsequently attempted 
to set aside his guilty plea and resulting con-
viction by contending that the trial court did 
not strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required 
by Srare v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 
1987). His motion was denied. Defendant now 
appeals the denial of his motion to set aside 
his guilty plea. We reverse and remand. 
When defendant originally entered his guilty 
plea, the trial court conducted a colloquy with 
defendant on the record regarding his desire to 
enter his plea. During that colloquy, the court 
addressed each of defendant's constitutional 
rights enumerated in Rule 11(5). The trial 
court did not, however, ask the defendant on 
the record if he knew that by pleading guilty 
he was waiving those rights. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court's 
failure to ask him specifically if he knew that 
he was waiving his rights rendered his plea 
unacceptable under Rule 1U5).1 Rule 11(5) 
provides in pertinent part: 
The court ... may not accept the 
plea until the court has found: 
(c) the defendant knows he has 
rights against compulsory self-
incrimination, to a jury trial, and to 
confront and cross-examine in 
open court the witnesses against 
him, and that by entering the plea 
he waives all of those rights; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) (emphases added). 
Defendant makes this claim even though in his 
affidavit he affirmatively acknowledged that 
he knew he was waiving each of his rights 
enumerated in Rule 1 l(5)(c). 
Recently, this court held in Srare v. Smith, 
812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App.), petition for cert, 
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 
1991), and State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 162 
Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App. 1991), that a 
trial court could consider both the colloquy and 
the affidavit in determining whether the 
defendant's plea was being entered in strict 
compliance with Rule 11(5).2 Subsequently, 
however, the Utah Supreme Court's decision 
in State v. Hoff, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 
(Utah 1991) seems to have foreclosed that 
interpretation. In Hoff, the supreme court 
stated that Gibbons requires that the trial 
court "personally establish[] that the defen-
dant's guilty plea is truly knowing and volu-
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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170 Utah Ad< 
ntary," and that the trial court "establish on 
the record that the defendant knowingly 
waived his or her constitutional rights and 
understood the elements of the crime." Hoff, 
164 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. Even though the 
affidavit in this case clearly and unequivocally 
states that the defendant has knowingly 
waived his constitutional rights, there is no 
such statement "on the record." Given the 
language in Hoff, the trial court must base its 
findings solely on the colloquy, without con-
sidering any statements made in the affidavit. 
Although the better approach may be to 
consider the colloquy and the affidavit in 
unison since both constitute evidence properly 
before the court, the supreme court has prec-
luded us from taking such an approach. We 
are therefore constrained to hold that the plea 
was defective because the trial court failed to 
address specifically with the defendant, in 
open court and "on the record," each and 
e\er> provision of Rule 11(5). We must do so 
c\en though the defendant affirmatively stated 
in his affidavit that he knew he was waiving 
his rights. 
We reverse the trial court's denial of defe-
ndant's motion to set aside his guilty plea and 
remand to the trial court for further procee-
dings consistent herewith. 
Russell W. Bench, Presiding Judge 
1 CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1 Defendant also claims that his guilty plea was not 
voluntary, and that he did not understand the 
nature and elements of the offenses to which he 
pleaded guilty. Inasmuch as we reverse because of 
the trial court's failure to specifically address each 
and every provision of Rule ll(5)(c) with the defe-
ndant on the record, we need not consider these 
allegations of error. 
2 Rule 11(5) does not mandate any colloquy "on 
the record." In fact, no such colloquy is ever men-
tioned in Rule 11(5). Strict compliance with the rule, 
therefore, only requires that there be evidence 
before the trial court to support each of the findings 
enumerated. This is the underlying reasoning of 
both Smith and Trujillo-Martincz. The require-
ment that the findings be based upon statements 
nude by the defendant "on the record" during a 
colloquy and not upon statements made in an affi-
davit is a requirement created by the supreme court 
io Gibbons. In other words, there are two require-
ments arising out of Gibbons: first, that there be 
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11(5), Gib-
kwj, 740 P.2d at 1313; and second, that the 
trial court conduct an adequate colloquy with the 
defendant on the record before accepting the plea. Id. 
w
 1314. It is therefore logically inappropriate to 
aate that the failure to conduct an adequate coll-
OQ"> is a failure to comply strictly with Rule 11(5). 
Tbe failure to conduct an adequate colloquy is cor-
jwly characterized as a violation of the common 
»* rule established in Gibbons. 
RUSSON, Judge (concurring): 
1 concur with the majority opinion, but 
write separately to express my reservations 
concerning the approach recently taken by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hoff, 164 
Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1991), and Srare v. 
Maguire, 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991) 
(per curiam). In Hoff and Maguire, the court 
extended State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 
(Utah 1987), to require that all of the elements 
of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)3 be 
expressly addressed in the plea colloquy, 
without regard to whether they are present in 
the affidavit. For the reasons set out in the 
majority opinion in State v. Trujillo-
Maninez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App. 
1991), and in my concurring opinion in State 
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 481-82 (Utah App. 
1991) (Russon, J., concurring), petition for cert. 
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah 
1991), both the affidavit and the colloquy 
should be used to assist a trial court in ascer-
taining on the record that a defendant's plea 
is truly knowingly and voluntarily made in 
compliance with Rule 11. Accordingly, I write 
separately to re-emphasize the points raised 
in Trujillo-Martinez and Smith. 
When used properly, the affidavit is an 
effective, as well as efficient, tool to aid the 
judge in ascertaining that a plea is, indeed, 
knowing and voluntary. The necessity of using 
an affidavit in conjunction with a thorough 
colloquy is readily apparent: 
There is nothing sacrosanct about 
an exchange between a trial judge 
and a criminal defendant at the 
time of taking a guilty plea. A 
guilty plea is most often received in 
a crowded courtroom with the 
defendant, often in shackles, 
looking up at a judge who, in black 
robe, peers down from an elevated 
bench. The judge questions the 
defendant while everyone in the 
courtroom watches and waits. 
Silence in such environment can be 
d e a f e n i n g , and the pressure 
immense. The situation impels the 
defendant to immediately answer 
the judge's questions. 
However, where an affidavit is 
used, the defendant has privacy and 
time to prepare, review, and discuss 
the affidavit with his lawyer. No 
one is watching and waiting. There 
are no time limitations. The defen-
dant has the opportunity to ask his 
lawyer the meaning of certain words 
and phrases. Consequently, there is 
more assurance of a knowing and 
voluntary plea when an affidavit is 
utilized than when it is not. Of 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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course, the trial judge must still be 
satisfied, by personal inquiry of the 
defendant, that the defendant act-
ually read the affidavit, reviewed it 
with counsel, and understands it. 
Smith, 812 P.2d at 481 (Russon, J., concur-
ring). Thus, proper use of an affidavit in 
conjunction with the colloquy promotes the 
trial judge's ability to determine that a.plea 
was knowingly made by the defendant, thus 
producing a guilty plea which is less suscept-
ible to reversal on appeal. 
Additionally, the use of affidavits in conj-
unction with the colloquy also ensures that the 
taking of guilty pleas is performed efficiently. 
The extent of the colloquy will then depend 
upon the needs of the defendant: 
A defendant who is a college grad-
uate and who informs the judge 
that he has read his affidavit, disc-
ussed it with his attorney, and 
understands it will naturally not 
require the kind of inquiry as will a 
defendant who has no education 
and little or no grasp of the English 
language. 
Id. at 481-82. Thus, efficiency is also served 
without sacrificing the criminal defendant's 
rights. 
However, the trial court's responsibility 
does not end with finding that the affidavit 
and colloquy together establish a knowing and 
voluntary plea. The trial court must also 
inquire as to whether the defendant has read 
and understands his affidavit, and whether he 
has discussed it with his attorney, in order for 
the judge to properly ascertain that such aff-
idavit was both knowingly and voluntarily 
signed. If the trial court does not so question 
the defendant, such affidavit cannot be used 
because of the lack of evidence that defendant 
is in any way familiar with the terms of the 
affidavit. However, in cases where the judge 
does sufficiently question the defendant about 
his affidavit, the affidavit should be permitted 
to cover any gaps in the colloquy. 
In Trujillo-Martinez, the trial court asked 
the defendant, "Have you gone over an affi-
davit with your attorney?," and "Do you 
understand the contents of that document?" 
Trujillo-Martinez, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65. 
Both questions were answered in the affirma-
tive. By doing so, the trial court was able to 
ascertain that Trujillo-Martinez had knowi-
ngly signed his affidavit. Furthermore, Trujillo-
Martinez testified that his plea was voluntarily 
made. Id. Likewise, in Smith, the trial court 
ascertained that the plea was knowingly and 
voluntarily made. Smith, 812 P.2d at 478-79. 
On the other hand, in Hoff, there is no indi-
cation that any attempt was made by the trial 
court to establish that Hoff had read and 
understood his affidavit. Thus, even if the 
court had used the approach of considering 
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the affidavit and colloquy in concert, the 
affidavit would have to be excluded. 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial 
court's failure to adequately question Dastrup 
as to his knowledge and understanding of his 
affidavit requires reversal. There is no ques-
tion that Dastrup's affidavit strictly complied 
with all of the Rule 11 elements. However, the 
plea colloquy at Dastrup's plea hearing was 
insufficient: 
THE COURT: Is your true and 
correct name Mark Raymond 
Dastrup? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. It is. 
THE COURT: How far did you go 
through school? 
DEFENDANT: Through grade 12, 
high school. 
THE COURT: Do you read and 
write the English language? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Have you had an 
opportunity to talk with your atto-
rney this morning? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you need any 
additional time to talk to him 
before I go forward with this arra-
ignment? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
THE COURT: Are you under the 
influence of alcohol or narcotics or 
suffering any mental illness? 
DEFENDANT: No. 
[At this time a copy of the 
Amended Information was given to 
defendant's counsel and read to 
defendant.] 
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup, 
it's my duty to advise you of your 
constitutional rights, advise you of 
the consequence of the matter 
before the court, make sure you 
understand them, and it's my duty 
to obtain a voluntary plea from 
you. So listen to me carefully, and 
if you have any questions, don't 
hesitate to stop me and I'll answer 
them. 
[Defendant's charges were read to 
him.] 
You have certain constitutional 
rights in this court. First, you're 
entitled to be represented by an 
attorney at every step in the proce-
edings, and you're represented by 
Mr. Hunt at this time. 
You're entitled to a speedy trial 
by an impartial jury. You're enti-
tled to confront and have your 
attorney cross examine in open 
court any witnesses that appear 
against you. You have a privilege 
against compulsory self incrimina-
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tion. That means you don't have to 
testify, if you don't desire to. You 
may stand mute and say nothing 
and the burden's still upon the 
State of Utah to prove you guilty, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Like-
wise, if you desire to testify, you 
have that right. 
You have a right to compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in 
your defense. At the time of trial it 
requires a unanimous verdict by the 
jury to convict you, and if you are 
convicted, you have the right to 
appeal the conviction to the Court 
of Appeals of the State of Utah. 
Now these are basically your 
constitutional rights. Mr. Hunt, 
have you advised him of these 
rights? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: In your opinion, 
does he understand them? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Do you have any 
questions you'd like to ask me, Mr. 
Dastrup? 
DEFENDANT: No. I don't believe 
so. 
[The terms of the plea agreement 
were explained.] 
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup, 
counsel has indicated a plea bargain 
and the only way I'll accept this 
plea bargain is on the basis that you 
admit that you actually committed 
the forgeries and theft that you've 
been charged with and admit the 
allegations as set forth in the 
Amended Information on each of 
the particular facts. That's the only 
way 1*11 do it. I don't want some-
body coming in and pleading in my 
court to something that they didn't 
do. Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And likewise, I've 
instructed the State's Attorney in 
these kinds of cases I want the sta-
tement signed by the defendant in 
writing, and a plea agreement. I 
assume you have that. 
PROSECUTION: We do, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: And I would insist 
that that likewise be executed in 
open court and that you initial each 
one of the paragraphs involved. I 
assume your attorney has advised 
you of that, Mr. Dastrup. 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now, you want me 
to accept this plea bargain then at 
this time, Mr. Dastrup? 
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DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now Mr. Dastrup, 
do you admit that you committed 
the forgeries, as set forth in the 
amended information, and commi-
tted the thefts on the dates, as set 
forth in the amended information? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
[Agreement was executed by defe-
ndant and counsel.] 
THE COURT: Now, let me just 
explain one other thing, Mr. 
Dastrup, before you sign this. This 
court takes the position as to what 
a person is charged with, that's up 
to the State of Utah to determine. 
In other words, the court doesn't 
make charges against anyone, so 
that's a matter for the State of 
Utah to determine. When it gets to 
the penalty phase of the case, then 
that's for the court to determine. 
That's not for counsel. So while I 
hear recommendations concerning 
the penalty phase, I'm the one 
that's going to have to make that 
determination. You've advised him 
of that Mr. Hunt? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: I have, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you understand 
that, Mr. Dastrup? 
DEFENDANT: Yes. I believe so. 
THE COURT: Thank you. The 
record should indicate that the 
court accepts the plea bargain. 
The record should indicate that 
Mr. Dastrup has executed in open 
court a statement of the defendant 
concerning these offenses. I would 
like him to initial each one of these 
paragraphs, counsel. 
The court's of the opinion that 
the defendant has been advised of 
his constitutional rights, the conse-
quence of the matter before the 
court. The court's of the opinion 
that he intelligently understands 
why he's here and that his plea is 
voluntary, and the court approves 
the plea bargain, as set forth by 
counsel. 
Although the trial court even went so far as 
to have Dastrup initial each provision in his 
affidavit, there was no indication during the 
colloquy that Dastrup had read and unders-
tood what he was initialing. In such circums-
tances, we have no choice but to hold that the 
trial court failed to adequately question 
Dastrup before concluding that Dastrup's plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily made. There-
fore, even using the approach of considering 
the affidavit and colloquy in concert, I agree 
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that this case must be reversed and remanded. 
As recently as State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court has 
agreed with this approach, looking at both the 
affidavit and colloquy in reaching its determ-
ination that Smith's guilty plea was not kno-
wingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 466. 
However, Hoff and Maguire go beyond this 
result and effectively eliminate the usefulness 
of affidavits in the taking of a guilty plea. Hoff 
extends the strict compliance rule of Gibbons to 
require that the judge "establish on the record 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t k n o w i n g l y 
waived his or her constitutional rights and 
understood the elements of the crime." Hoff, 
164 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22 (emphasis added). 
In so holding, the Utah Supreme Court now 
requires rote recitation of all of the Rule 11 
elements in the colloquy, without regard to 
whether they are specified in the affidavit. 
Requiring rote recitation of Rule 11 requi-
rements effectively destroys the positive 
aspects of using an affidavit in conjunction 
with the colloquy. There is no longer an 
impetus for parties to prepare a thorough 
affidavit if the affidavit is to be ignored at the 
time of the taking of the plea. Moreover, with 
rote recitation becoming the rule, a new 
avenue to appeal the taking of guilty pleas 
opens. Now, despite the fact that the defen-
dant orally waives all of his rights and says 
that he has done so knowingly and volunta-
rily, defense counsel can argue that his client 
felt pressured to say so or the procedure was a 
mere formality, and hence the judge did not 
actually ascertain whether such waiver was, 
indeed, knowing and voluntary. All of this can 
be avoided if an affidavit is used in concert 
with a thorough colloquy which includes 
questions as to defendant's understanding of 
his affidavit. 
Accordingly, I concur, but with the above 
reservations. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. Rule 11(5) provides: 
The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty or no contest, and may not accept 
the plea until the court has found: 
(a) if the defendant is not represented 
by counsel, he has knowingly waived his 
right to counsel and does not desire 
counsel; 
(b) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(c) the defendant knows he has rights 
against compulsory self-incrimination, 
to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-
examine in open court the witnesses 
against him, and that by entering the 
plea he waives all of those rights; 
(d) the defendant understands the 
nature and elements of the offense to 
which be is entering the plea; that upon 
trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those dem-
ents beyond a reasonable doubt; and 
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that the plea is an admission of ali those 
elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence that may be 
imposed upon him for each offense to 
which a plea is entered, including the 
possibility of the imposition of consec-
utive sentences; 
(0 if the tendered plea is a result of a 
prior plea discussion and plea agree-
ment, and if so, what agreement has 
been reached; and 
(g) the defendant, has been advised of 
the time limits for filing any motion to 
withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest. 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction 
Company, Inc. (Wadsworth) was the unsucc-
essful bidder on a public works project in Salt 
Lake County (the County) and sued for 
damages on contract and negligence theories. 
The trial court awarded Wadsworth damages 
for lost profits on a motion for summary 
judgment and the County appealed. We 
reverse and remand. 
I. FACTS 
On July 8, 1985, the County invited comp-
etitive, sealed bids by advertisement for con-
struction of the Scott Avenue Basin flood 
control project on Millcreek. The bid advert-
REPORTS 
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STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
Criminal No. I/C-'~ 
COMES NOW, Mark Dastrup, the Defendant in this case and hereby 
cknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s): 
<'ful» 10 counts of Forgery, a second degree felony, punishable 
y a prison term of 1 to 15 years in the state prison and a fine 
f $10
'
000
-
00
 Ic^sU^cW^U^ 
~PIAJ2. 8 counts of Theft ^  a third degree relony, punishable by<J>c^ u^  
prison term of up to 5 years in the state prison and s fine of T^HJ-
5,000.00. 
-1W I have received a copy of the information against me, I have 
ead it, and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) 
or which I am pleading guilty. 
,^The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as 
ollows: That on the dates set forth in the information I signed 
name on a check other than my own. Further, that on the dates 
s set forth on the information I obtained control of money 
belonging to another with the intent to deprive the owner of said 
loney. 
y My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am 
criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) 
charged are as follows: That I signed the name of another person 
to a check and obtained money without the owner's permission. 
surf I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with 
knowledge and understanding of the following facts: 
Hv0 1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an 
attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be 
appointed by the Court at no cost to me, 
>^ 2. I have not waived my right to counsel. 
^ 3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this 
statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges, 
my rights in this and other proceedings and the consequences of my 
plea of guilty. 
/^ 4. I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
Lawrence H. Hunt, and I have had an opportunity to discuss this 
statement, my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with 
my attorney. 
***
J
 5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
-;•«>. 6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them 
cross-examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined 
by my attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my 
witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in Court upon my 
behalf. 
-4>uj; ?• * know that I have a right to testify in my own behalf 
but if I choose not to do so I can not be compelled to testify or 
give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will be 
drawn against me if I do not testify. 
«*t0 8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me 
I need only plead "not guilty" and the matter will be set for 
trial, at which time the State of Utah will have the burden of 
proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. If 
the trial is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
2 
~fe*? 9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if I were 
ried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I would have the 
ight to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of 
ppeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of Utah and that 
f I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs 
ould be paid by the State* 
^ 1 0 . I know that the maximum possible sentence may be imposed 
pon my plea of guilty, and that sentence may be for a prison term, 
ine, or both. I know that in addition to any fine, a 25% 
urcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated 63-63-9, will be 
mposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
estitution to any victim or victims of my crimes. 
^ 1 1 . I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, 
r the fine for additional amounts, if my plea is to be more than 
ne charge. I also know that if I am on probation, parole or 
waiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
onvicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my plea in the present 
ction may result in consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
^ 12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am 
aiving my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the 
r^eceding paragraphs. I also know that by entering such plea(s) 
am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the conduct 
lleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are 
mtered. 
*t*7 13. My plea(s) of guilty is/are not the result of a plea 
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney, the promises, 
luties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are fully 
contained in the Plea Agreement attached to this Affidavit. 
7^14. I know that any charge or sentencing concession or 
•ecommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a 
-eduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by either 
lefense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the 
rudge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what 
;hey believe the Court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
3 
-2^15. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind 
have been made to induce me to plead guilty, and no promises, 
except those contained herein and in the attached plea agreement, 
have been made to me. 
-*,^16. I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me 
by my attorney, and I understand its provisions. I know that I am 
free to change or delete anything contained in this Affidavit. I 
do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are 
correct. 
~ryutfl7. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my 
attorney. 
/fajlB. I am y C» years of age; I have attended school through 
the }T** grade and I can read and understand the English 
language. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication 
or intoxicants when the decision to enter the plea(s) was made. 
I am not presently under the influence of any drugs, medication or 
intoxicants. 
~fU# 19. I believe myself to be of a sound and discerning mind, 
mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and the 
consequences of my plea and free of any mental disease, defect or 
impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this " 7 day of March, 1989. 
-vyla*£ /kadi,,*/ 
MARK DASTRUP 
DEFENDANT 
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